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Abstract
We generalize to abstract many-sorted algebras the classical proof-theoretic result due to Parsons, Mints and Takeuti that an
assertion ∀x ∃yP(x, y) (where P is 01), provable in Peano arithmetic with 01 induction, has a primitive recursive selection
function. This involves a corresponding generalization to such algebras of the notion of primitive recursiveness. The main difficulty
encountered in carrying out this generalization turns out to be the fact that equality over these algebras may not be computable,
and hence atomic formulas in their signatures may not be decidable. The solution given here is to develop an appropriate concept
of realizability of existential assertions over such algebras, generalized to realizability of sequents of existential assertions. In this
way, the results can be seen to hold for classical proof systems.
This investigation may give some insight into the relationship between specifiability and computability for data types such as
the reals, where the atomic formulas, i.e., equations between terms of type real, are not computable.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background: Parsons–Mints–Takeuti theorem; attempted generalizations
We investigate a class of problems concerning the relationship between specifiability and computability for a wide
class of abstract data types, modelled as many-sorted algebras A, of the following form. Given a predicate P of a
certain syntactic class in the specification language Lang(A) for A, and a proof of the assertion
∀x ∃yP(x, y) (1.1)
in a suitable formal system F for A, can we construct, from this proof, a computable selection function for P , i.e., a
computable function f on A such that
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∀xP(x, f(x)) (1.2)
holds in A? A positive answer to this question, under sutiable conditions, will be called a selection theorem. (Here the
notion of “computable on A” must also be explicated.)
Specifically, we want to generalize to such algebras a classical proof-theoretic result, due (independently) to
Parsons [20,21], Mints [19], and Takeuti [26, remark after Cor. 12.16], which gives a positive solution to the above
problem in the case that F is Peano arithmetic (PA) with induction restricted to 01 formulas, P is a 01 predicate
of PA, in which case a primitive recursive selection function f can then be found. As a corollary, a general recur-
sive function which is provably total in PA with 01-induction is (extensionally equivalent to) a primitive recursive
function.
In [30] this result was generalized to predicates over many-sorted signatures Σ containing the boolean and natural
sorts, with their standard operations, and abstract many-sorted Σ-algebras A. The method used was adapted from
Mints’s method, involving cut-reduction and an analysis of cut-reduced derivations, with restricted (∗1) induction. The
result used a generalization of primitive recursive schemes to many-sorted signatures and algebras. The generalization
went quite smoothly, on the assumption that equality in A was computable, so that the atomic formulas of the first-order
language over Σ were computably decidable in A.
The case that equality in A is not computable provides a difficulty for this generalization. In such a case, a more
delicate analysis of formal derivations of assertions of the form (1.1) is required.
To clarify these issues by an example, consider the topological total algebra of reals
R = (R, N, B; 0, 1, +, −, ×, . . . ) (1.3)
(“topological” in the sense that all the carriers have topologies in terms of which the basic operations are continuous;
“total” in the sense that the basic operations are total [35]). The algebra R contains the carrier R of reals with its
usual topology and its ring operations, as well as the carriers N and B of naturals and booleans, with their discrete
topologies and standard operations. Note that there is no division operation on R, since no such (total) operation can
be continuous. Similarly, although there is an equality test (i.e., a boolean valued equality operation) on N, there is
none on R, since a (total) equality operation on R cannot be continuous.1
However the specification language Lang(A), in which the predicates P (1.1) are expressed, has, as atomic formulas,
equations between terms of the same sort, for all sorts of A, including, e.g., the sort of reals in the above example. It
follows that the atomic formulas in Lang(A) are not computable.
This problem was solved in [36], by using, not just a primitive recursive selector for an existential statement, but a
primitive recursive realizer for each formula, which also carries information on which component of a disjunction holds
(as in the antecedent of the conclusion of the ∨L inference). However this technique only worked by restricting attention
to intuitionistic deductive systems. Hence, the resulting selection theorem could not really be called a generalization
of the Parsons–Mints–Takeuti theorem.
1.2. The present work
This problem of the restriction to intuitionistic systems has now been solved by extending the notion of realizability
to sequents as well as formulas, as was done in [24]. The resulting selection theorem, in which neither the decidability
of atomic formulas, nor the use of intuitionistic deductive systems, need to be assumed, is a genuine generalization of
the Parsons–Mints–Takeuti theorem, and forms the main result of this paper.
This investigation may give some insight into the relationship between specifiability and computability for data
types such as the reals, where the atomic formulas, i.e., equations between terms of type real, are not computable.
In particular, it provides an example, in the context of verifiable specifications on such data types of the general
programme proposed by Kreisel [16] of discovering “what more we know when we have proved a theorem than if we
only know that it is true”.
1 One can define continuous partial division and equality operations on the reals [34]; however in this paper we only consider total algebras. This
is discussed further in Section 8.
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1.3. Previous work in realizability and related selection theorems
Realizability, as a technique in proof theory, goes back to [13]. Since then many variants have been developed.
Thorough treatments of various versions of realizability applied to Heyting arithmetic and related systems, with
extensive bibliography, are given in [27,28].
With regard to fragments of arithmetic and related systems: apart from the pioneering work of Parsons, Mints and
Takeuti mentioned above [20,19,26], a number of researchers have explored selection and realizability methods for
various fragments, not all assuming decidability of equality. Sieg [23] described a generic Skolemisetion method for
subsystems of arithmetic. Buss [4] described various “witnessing methods” in fragments of arithmetic, which have
been very successfully applied, especially in weak bounded arithmetics [6]. Both assume decidability of equality (as
in Section 5 of the present paper). Leivant [17] used realizability methods for characterising poly-time functions,
using Herbrand–Gödel equations with a weak second order intuitionistic logic, in which decidability of equality is
not assumed (as in Section 6 of the present paper). Schlüter [22] extended Leivant’s result to realizability of classical
sequents.
The latter technique for realizing classical sequents has been used more recently in Feferman-style self-applicative
systems, which form the operational core of Feferman’s explicit mathematics [9,10]. The paper [24] studies a whole
family of bounded applicative theories and their relation to complexity classes, whereas Cantini [7] gave a perspicuous
characterisation of the poly-time functions by using a form of safe induction in an applicative context. The papers
[8,25] contain extensions of the results in [24]. As with the realizability studied in Section 7 of the present paper,
equality cannot be assumed to be decidable in self-applicative theories.
It should be noted that the present paper, as well as [30,36], deal with a fragment (namely ∗1 induction), not
specifically of arithmetic, but more generally, of proof systems for abstract many-sorted algebras.
1.4. Outline of this paper
Section 2 provides a short background to N-standard many-sorted signatures and algebras, i.e., many-sorted signa-
tures and algebras with the sorts of booleans and naturals, with the standard operations on these. Section 3 explains the
generalization of primitive recursiveness to such signatures and algebras, and Section 4 describes the corresponding
specification languages.
To provide background and context for the main results of this paper, Sections 5 and 6 summarise the two previous
(restricted) generalizations of the Parsons–Mints–Takeuti theorem mentioned above: Section 5 for algebras with
decidable equality, and Section 6 for intuitionistic deductive systems.
Section 7 gives the main result of this paper: the generalized selection theorem, without either of the two restrictions
needed in Sections 5 and 6; i.e., not assuming decidability of equality, and working in a classical deductive system.
Section 8 gives some concluding remarks.
2. Many-sorted signatures and algebras
We give a short introduction to many-sorted algebras. Details may be found in any of [31,32,34,35]. Given a signature
Σ with finitely many sorts s, . . . and function symbols
F: u → s, (2.1)
where u is the product type u = s1 × · · · × sm, a Σ-algebra A consists of a carrier As for each Σ-sort s, and a total
function
FA : Au → As
for each Σ-function symbol as in (2.1), where Au = As1 × · · · × Asm . We let s, . . . range over Σ-sorts, andu, v,w, . . .
over Σ-product types.
We are interested in signatures and algebras with certain properties.
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2.1. N-standard signatures and algebras
The signatures Σ and Σ-algebras A are said to be N-standard if they contain
(a) the sort bool of booleans and the corresponding carrier Abool = B = {t, f}, together with the standard boolean
and boolean-valued operations, including the conditional at all sorts, and equality at certain sorts (“equality
sorts”); and also
(b) the sort nat of natural numbers and the corresponding carrier Anat = N = {0, 1, 2, . . . }, together with the
standard arithmetical operations of zero, successor, equality and order on N.
We make two assumptions on our signatures Σ and Σ-algebras A.
Assumption 1 (N-standardness). The signatures and Σ-algebras are N-standard.
Assumption 2 (Instantiation). For every sort s of Σ , there is a closed term of sort s, called the default term δs of
that sort.
The Instantiation Assumption will be used in the proof of the Main Lemma in Section 7.
Let NStdAlg(Σ) denote the class of N-standard algebras over Σ .
2.2. Array signatures and algebras
Array signatures Σ∗ and array algebras A∗, are formed from N-standard signatures Σ and algebras A by adding,
for each sort s, an array sort s∗, with corresponding carrier A∗s consisting of all arrays or finite sequences over As ,
together with certain standard array operations. Details are given in [32] and (an equivalent but simpler version) in
[31,33].
We will generally work with array signatures and algebras, for reasons that will become clear below.
3. Computation schemes
We will present two systems of computation schemes over Σ : PR and μPR.
3.1. PR() and PR∗() computation schemes
Given an N-standard signature Σ , we define PR schemes over Σ which generalize the schemes for primitive
recursive functions over N in [14]. They define (total) functions f either outright (as in the base cases (i)–(ii) below)
or from other functions (g, . . . , h, . . . ) (as in the inductive cases (iii)–(v)) as follows:
(i) Primitive Σ-functions:
f(x) = F(x)
of type u → s, for all the primitive Σ-function symbols F : u → s, where x : u, i.e., x is a tuple of variables of
product type u.
(ii) Projection:
f(x) = xi
of type u → si , where x = (x1, . . . , xm) is of type u = s1 × · · · × sm.
(iii) Composition:
f(x) = h(g1(x), . . . , gm(x))
of type u → s, where gi : u → si (i = 1, . . . , m) and h : s1 × · · · × sm → s.
(iv) Deﬁnition by cases:
f(x) =
{
g1(x) if h(x) = t
g2(x) if h(x) = f
of type u → s, where g1, g2 : u → s and h : u → bool.
T. Strahm, J. Zucker / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 76 (2008) 175–197 179
(v) Simultaneous primitive recursion on N: This defines, on each A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ), for fixed m > 0 (the degree
of simultaneity), n ≥ 0 (the number of parameters), and product types u and v = s1 × · · · × sm, an m-tuple of
functions f = (f1, . . . , fm) with fi : nat × u → si , such that for all x ∈ Au and i = 1, . . . , m,
fi (0, x) = gi (x),
fi (z+ 1, x) = hi (z, x, f1(z, x), . . . , fm(z, x)),
where gi : u → si and hi : nat × u × v → s1 (i = 1, . . . , m).
Note that the last scheme uses the N-standardness of the algebras, i.e. the carrier N.
A PR(Σ) scheme α : u → s defines, or rather computes, a function fAα : Au → As , or, more generally, a family
of such functions { fAα | A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ) }, uniformly for A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ).
A broader class of functions provides a more appropriate generalization of the notion of primitive recursiveness
for our purposes, namely PR∗ computability. A function on A is PR∗(Σ) computable if it is defined by a PR scheme
over Σ∗, interpreted on A∗ (i.e., using starred sorts for the auxiliary functions used in its definition). Note that in the
classical setting (A = N = the naturals with their standard operations) this generalization is not necessary, since N ∗
can effectively be coded in N . In general, however, this is not the case; R∗, for example, cannot be effectively coded
in R.
We write PR(A) for the class of functions PR computable on A, etc.
3.2. μPR(Σ) and μPR∗(Σ) computation schemes
The μPR schemes over Σ are formed by adding to the PR schemes the scheme:
(vi) Least number or μ operator:
f(x) 	 μz[g(x, z) = t]
of type u → nat, where g : u × nat → bool is μPR. The interpretation of this is that fA(x) ↓ z if, and only
if, gA(x, y) ↓ f for each y < z and gA(x, z) ↓ t.
Note that this scheme also uses the N-standardness of the algebra. Also, μPR computable functions are, in general,
partial. The notation f (x) ↓ y means that f (x) is defined and equal to y. The notation ‘	’ means that the two
sides are either both defined and equal, or both undefined. The schemes for composition and simultaneous primitive
recursion are correspondingly re-interpreted to allow for partial functions.
These schemes generalize those given in [14] for partial recursive functions over N.
Again, a broader class turns out to be more appropriate for our purposes, namely μPR∗ computability. This is just
PR∗ computability with μ.
There are many other models of computability, due to Moschovakis, Friedman, Shepherdson and others, which turn
out to be equivalent to μPR∗ computability: see [32, Section 7]. All these equivalences have led to the postulation of
a generalized Church–Turing Thesis for deterministic computation of functions, which can be roughly formulated as
follows:
Computability of functions on many-sorted algebras by deterministic algorithms can be formalised by μPR∗ com-
putability.
3.3. Comparison with imperative computational models
In [32] computation on many-sorted Σ-algebras was investigated, using imperative programming models: While(Σ),
based on the ‘ while’ loop construct over Σ , For(Σ), based similarly on the ‘ for’ loop, and While∗(Σ) and For∗(Σ),
which use arrays, i.e., auxiliary variables of starred sort over Σ .
Writing While(A) for the class of functions While-computable on A, etc., we can list the equivalences between the
“schematic”and “imperative” computational models:
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(1) PR(A) = For(A)
(2) PR∗(A) = For∗(A)
(3) μPR(A) = While(A)
(4) μPR∗(A) = While∗(A),
in all cases, uniformly for A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ).
These results are all stated in [32], and can be proved by the methods of [29].
4. The language Lang∗(Σ); ∗1 formulas; the system 
∗
1-Ind
4.1. The language Lang∗(Σ)
We let Lang(Σ) denote the first order language over Σ , and let Lang∗(Σ) = Lang(Σ∗), the first order language
over Σ∗. The atomic formulas of Lang(Σ) are equations between terms of the same sort, for all Σ-sorts (not just
equality sorts). Similarly, Lang∗(Σ) = Lang(Σ∗) is the first order language over Σ∗, with equality at all Σ∗-sorts.
Notation. (1) We use x, y, z, . . . for variables or tuples of variables, x∗ . . . for starred (or array) variables or tuples
of variables, k, . . . for variables of sort nat, and t, t ′, . . . for Σ∗-terms or tuples of terms. We write t : s to indicate
that t is a term of sort s, and t : u that t is a tuple of terms of product type u.
(2) We define application of function tuples to argument tuples in the obvious way, i.e., if f : u → v is a tuple of
function symbols (f1, . . . , fm) where fi : u → si (i = 1, . . . , m) with v = s1 × · · · × sm, and x : u, then f(x) ≡df
(f1(x), . . . , fm(x)).
Our proof system is based on the classical sequent calculus [12,26] with sequents
 −→ , (4.1)
where  and  are finite sequences of formulas of Lang∗(Σ), with the informal meaning: the conjunction of the
antecedent  implies the disjunction of the succedent . (Unlike [12,26], however, we will place our principle formulas
on the “inside” of the sequents, to simplify the notation in the later sections.)
We are interested in a certain sublanguage of Lang∗(Σ), namely the class of ∗1 formulas over Σ , which we now
define.
4.2. Subclasses of Lang∗(Σ)
(a) BU quantiﬁers, equations and sequents.
(i) A BU (bounded universal) quantifier is a quantifier of the form ‘∀k < t’, where k : nat and t : nat. (The
most elegant approach is to think of this as a primitive construct, with its own introduction rule: see below.)
(ii) A BU equation is formed by prefixing an equation by a string of 0 or more bounded universal quantifiers.
(iii) A conditional BU equation is a formula of the form
Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn → P, (4.2)
where n ≥ 0 and Qi and P are BU equations. A conditional BU equational theory is a set of such formulas
(or their universal closures).
(iv) A BU equational sequent is a sequent of the form
Q1, . . . , Qn −→ P, (4.3)
where the Qi and P are BU equations. This sequent corresponds to the conditional BU equation (4.2).
(b) Elementary formulas.
A formula of Lang∗(Σ) is elementary if it is formed from Σ∗-equations by applying conjunctions, disjunctions,
and BU quantification (in any order).
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(c) ∗1 formulas.2
A formula is ∗1 if it is formed from Σ
∗
-equations by applying conjunctions, disjunctions, BU quantification and
also existential Σ∗-quantification, i.e., unbounded existential quantification over any sort in Σ∗ (in any order).
(d) Prenex ∗1 formulas.
A formula is in prenex ∗1 if it is formed from an elementary formula by applying (0 or more) existential
Σ∗-quantifications, only.
Lemma 1 (Prenex form of a ∗1 formula). Every ∗1 formula is effectively equivalent to a prenex ∗1 formula, provably
in the intuitionistic system ∗1-Indi (defined below in Section 4.3).
The construction of the prenex form is by structural induction on the formula. In the case of permuting an ‘∃’ with
a BU quantifier, the existentially quantified variable changes to a starred sort (if it is not already starred):
∀k < t ∃xP(k, x) −→ ∃x∗ ∀k < t P (k, x∗[k]).
Some details of the intuitionistic derivability of this sequent are given in [30].
Lemma 2. If P is an elementary formula all of whose variables are of equality sort, then the predicate defined by P
is PR∗ computable.
Let T be a set of formulas in Lang∗, which we can think of as axioms for a class of Σ∗-algebras. We make the
following assumption about T .
Assumption 3 (Conditional BU axiomatization). The axiomatization T consists of conditional BU Σ∗-equations.
Note that this is a stricter condition than conditional ∗1 formulas, since it excludes disjunctions and existential
quantification. However, this assumption is not unduly restrictive, as it includes axiomatizations by conditional
equations, and (hence) Horn formulas, which are central to the theory of logic programming and abstract data types
[18].
We will define a sequent calculus ∗1-Ind(Σ, T ) with the axioms T as extra initial sequents.
4.3. The classical sequent calculus ∗1-Ind(Σ, T )
This system has the following inference rules: rules for the first order predicate calculus with equality over the
signature Σ∗, including cut as in [12,26]; the ∗1 induction rule
, P (a) −→ P(Sa), 
, P (0) −→ P(t),  , (4.4)
where the induction formula P(a) is ∗1, and the induction variable a : nat does not occur in ,  or P(0); and rules
for the BU quantifier:
∀bL :  −→ t0 < t,  , Q(t0) −→ 
, ∀k < t Q(k) −→  , ∀bR :
, a < t −→ P(a), 
 −→ ∀k < t P (k),  ,
where t0 and t are terms of sort nat, and a : nat is the ‘eigenvariable’ of the inference ∀bR, which does not occur in
the conclusion of that inference. (We could also add two rules for the bounded existential quantifier, dual to the above,
although this quantifier is not really needed in the subsequent development.)
The axioms (initial sequents) are the closures under substitution of the following: the Σ∗-equality axioms; the
standard axioms for bool, including
−→ (xbool = true) ∨ (xbool = false), (4.5a)
true = false −→ t1 = t2 (4.5b)
2 The notation may be a bit confusing: Σ∗ refers to a signature with array sorts, whereas ∗1 refers to a particular syntactic class of formulas over
Σ∗.
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for arbitrary terms t1, t2 of the same sort; the axioms for zero and successor on nat:
S m = S n −→ m = n,
S n = 0 −→ t1 = t2
for nat variables m, n and arbitrary terms t1, t2 of the same sort; the primitive recursive defining equations for ‘<’ on
nat (which is needed for the BU quantifier rules and array axioms), and (optionally) symbols and defining equations
for other primitive recursive functions on nat; a certain set of conditional BU axioms for arrays,3 including the BU
equational sequent for array equality:
Lgth(a∗1) = Lgth(a∗2), ∀z < Lgth(a∗1)
(
a∗1[z] = a∗2[z]
) −→ a∗1 = a∗2 (4.6)
and, finally, the axioms T in sequent form (cf. Section 4.2(a)(iv)).
Remarks (Initial sequents). (1) It follows from Assumption 3 that the initial sequents of the calculus ∗1-Ind(Σ, T )
are all ∗1 . In fact, they are all BU equational (except for (4.5a), which is a disjunction of equations). This is important
for the proof of the Main Lemma in Sections 5–7.
(2) The initial sequents were defined so as to be closed under substitution. This is to facilitate the proof of the cut
reduction lemma (Section 5.1).
Now let K ⊆ NStdAlg(Σ), and let T be a set of formulas in Lang∗ such that K |= T . (We could suppose that T
is a “complete N-standard axiomatization” for K, i.e., that K is the class of all N-standard Σ-structures satisfying T ,
although this is unnecessary for the subsequent development.) The following soundness result then clearly holds:
Lemma (Soundness of ∗1-Ind). ∗1-Ind(Σ, T )  P ⇒ K∗ |= P .
4.4. The intuitionistic sequent calculus ∗1-Indi(Σ, T )
This consists of intuitionistic sequents of the form (4.1), where  consists of exactly one formula. The inference
rules have their intuitionistic form, as described in [12,26]. In particular, the intuitionistic induction rule has the form
(4.4) with  empty. Note also that by Assumption 3, the axioms T have the form (4.3) of intuitionistic sequents.
Since ∗1-Indi is a subsystem of ∗1-Ind, the soundness lemma (Lemma 2) obviously still holds for ∗1-Indi.
4.5. Equational specifications of PR(∗) functions
For any PR(Σ) scheme α, we can construct a equational specification, i.e., a finite set Eα of “specifying equations”
for the function fAα , defined by α on all A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ), as well as for the auxiliary functions gα used in the definition
of α. The set Eα consists of equations in an expanded signature Σα = Σ ∪ {gα, fα}. It is defined by structural induction
on α.
Similarly with PR∗ computability: for a PR∗(Σ) derivation α, there is a set Eα of specifying equations for the
function fα and the auxiliary functions gα in the signature Σ∗α = Σ∗ ∪ {gα, fα}.
Although we do not use the following in this paper, we mention that for μPR∗ schemes α, we can similarly construct
a conditional BU equational specification in an expanded signature Σ∗α = Σ∗ ∪ {gα, fα}, which specifies fAα on all
N-standard Σ-algebras A in which fAα is total. Note that conditional BU equations are needed for the specification of
the μ operator.
Details of the above can be found in [33].
4.6. ∗1 computation predicates; provable totality of schemes
We present another specification system for schemes, using ∗1 predicates, but not expanded signatures.
With each μPR∗(Σ) scheme α : u → s, we can effectively associate a ∗1!(Σ) formula Pα(x, y), the com-
putation predicate for α, where x : u and y : s, which represents the graph of the function defined by α, i.e.,
3 Listed in [33, Section 3.2].
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for all A ∈ NStdAlg(Σ), and for all a ∈ Au and b ∈ As ,
A |= Pα[a, b] ⇐⇒ αA(a) ↓ b.
The construction of Pα is by structural induction on α. Details can be found in [30].
Note that even if the scheme α is defined over Σ only, i.e., μPR or even PR, the definition of Pα generally involves
existential quantification over starred sorts.
A scheme α is said to be provably total in ∗1-Ind(Σ, T ) iff
∗1-Ind(Σ, T )  ∀x ∃yPα(x, y).
Lemma (Totality for PR∗ schemes). If α is a PR∗ scheme, then α is provably total in ∗1-Indi(Σ).
The required derivation is constructed by structural induction on α. Details can be found in [30].
5. Selection theorem for algebras with computable equality
5.1. Statements of main results
The central result of this paper is formulated with reference to a class K of N-standard Σ-algebras and an
axiomatization T of K.
Theorem 1 (Selection theorem). Suppose K |= T where K ⊆ NStdAlg(Σ), and T consists of conditional BU
Σ∗-equations. If
∗1-Ind(Σ, T )  ∃yP(x, y),
where P(x, y) is an elementary formula, with free variables x : u and y : v, then there is a PR∗ scheme tuple
α : u → v such that
for all A ∈ K, and all x ∈ Au, A |= P [x, fAα (x)]. (5.1)
The function (tuple) fAα is called a selection function, realizing function, Skolem function or witnessing function for y
in P .
As a corollary, we have a kind of converse to the Totality Lemma in Section 4.5.
Corollary. Suppose K |= T where K ⊆ NStdAlg(Σ) and T consists of conditional BU Σ∗-equations. If a μPR∗
scheme α is provably total in ∗1-Ind(Σ, T ), then α is extensionally PR∗ on K, i.e., there is a PR∗ scheme β such that
fAα = fAβ for all A ∈ K.
A stronger version of Theorem 1 involves replacing (5.1) by a provability condition:
Theorem 2 (Provable selection theorem). Suppose T consists of conditional BU Σ∗-equations. If
∗1-Ind(Σ, T )  ∃yP(x, y),
where P(x, y) is an elementary formula, with free variables x : u and y : v, then there is a PR∗ scheme tuple α : u → s
such that
∗1-Ind(Σ∗α, T + Eα)  P(x, fα(x)),
where Σ∗α is the extension of Σ∗ with symbols for the functions fα : u → v defined by the scheme tuple α, together
with their auxiliary functions, and Eα is the equational specification for these functions given in Section 4.4.
Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2. Theorem 2, in turn, follows immediately from a more
general result. We first need some definitions and notation.
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Definitions (∗1 sequent and derivation).
(1) A sequent is called ∗1 if all its formulas are ∗1 .
(2) A derivation is called ∗1 if all its sequents are ∗1 .
Definitions and notation (Prenex form of a sequent).
In this section (only) we use the following notation.
(3) For any ∗1 formula P(x) containing (only) the variables x free, we write its prenex form (Section 4.1, Lemma
1) as ∃yP 0(x, y), with P 0 elementary.
(4) Given a ∗1 sequent
Q1, . . . ,Qm −→ P1, . . . , Pn, (5.2)
its prenex form is the corresponding sequent of prenex forms of the formulas:
∃z1Q01(x, z1), . . . , ∃zmQ0m(x, zm) −→ ∃y1P 01 (x, y1), · · · , ∃ynP 0n (x, yn), (5.3)
where x contains all free variables of the sequent.
Main Lemma. Suppose the ∗1 sequent (5.2) is provable in 
∗
1-Ind(Σ, T ). Let its prenex form be as in (5.3). Then
we can construct tuples of PR∗(Σ) schemes α1, . . . , αn such that
Q01(x, z1), . . . , Q
0
m(x, zm) −→ P 01 (x, fα1(x, z)), · · · , P 0n (x, fαn(x, z)), (5.4)
(where z ≡ z1, . . . , zm) is provable in ∗1-Ind(Σ∗α1,... ,αn , T + Eα1,... ,αn), where Eα1,... ,αn is the combined equational
specification for the functions fα1 , . . . , fαn in the signature Σ∗α1,... ,αn .
In order to prove the Main Lemma, we must first prove the following
Cut reduction lemma. Every derivation D in ∗1-Ind, with ∗1 initial sequents, can be transformed into a derivationD′ of the same end-sequent containing only ∗1 cuts. Moreover, if the end-sequent is ∗1 then so is the whole derivation.
The proof of this lemma proceeds by a technique similar to that in the proof of Gentzen’s Hauptsatz (see [12, III,
Section 3] or [26, Section 5]). Details are given in [30].
5.2. Proof of main lemma
By the Cut Reduction Lemma and the Remark on initial sequents in Section 4.2, we can assume we have a ∗1
derivation of (5.2).
There are different cases according to the last inference. It is given in some detail in [30]. We cover a few cases that
most concern us.
The result holds trivially for initial sequents, by the Remark on initial sequents in Section 4.2.
A PR∗ selection function for ∗1 induction can be defined by the scheme for primitive recursion.
Consider now Contr:R. Rewriting the premiss and conclusion in prenex form, we have:
. . . , ∃zjQ0j (x, zj ), . . . −→ ∃yP 0(x, y), ∃yP 0(x, y), . . .
. . . , ∃zjQ0j (x, zj ), . . . −→ ∃yP 0(x, y), . . .
.
By induction hypothesis there are PR∗ functions f1, f2 such that
. . . , Q0j (x, zj ), . . . −→ . . . , P 0(x, f1(x, z)), P 0(x, f2(x, z))
is provable. So define the vector of PR functions
f(x, z) =
{
f1(x, z) if P 0(x, f1(x, z)),
f2(x, z) otherwise
(5.5)
using definition by cases. Then f is a selection function for ∃yP 0 in the conclusion.
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Note that for (5.5) to define a PR∗ function, we need primitive recursive decidability of elementary formulas such
as P 0.
A similar situation arises with the rules ∧R and ∨L, because of the implicit contraction of the (non-principal)
formulas in the succedent. Consider, for example, the rule ∨L:
. . . , Q1 −→ P, . . . . . . , Q2 −→ P, . . .
. . . , Q1 ∨ Q2 −→ P, . . . . (5.6)
Rewriting the premisses and conclusion in prenex form, we have:
. . . , ∃z1Q01(x, z1), −→ ∃yP 0(x, y), . . . . . . , ∃z2Q02(x, z2), −→ ∃yP 0(x, y), . . .
. . . , ∃z1z2(Q01(x, z1) ∨ Q02(x, z2)), −→ ∃yP 0(x, y), . . .
. (5.7)
By induction hypothesis there are PR∗ functions f1, f2 such that
. . . , Q01(x, z1) −→ P 0(x, f1(x, z)), . . .
. . . , Q02(x, z2), −→ P 0(x, f2(x, z)), . . .
are provable. As a selector for ∃yP 0 in the conclusion of (5.7), we can then define
f(x, z) =
{
f1(x, z) if Q01(x, z1),
f2(x, z) otherwise
(and similarly for the other formulas in the consequent), assuming, again, that we have PR∗ decidability of elementary
formulas.
This is guaranteed by the
Computable Equality Assumption. All sorts of Σ have PR∗ computable equality.
Note that this assumption (unlike Assumptions 1–3) does not hold throughout this paper. In particular, it does not
hold in Sections 6 and 7, as we will see.
Lemma. Under the Computable Equality Assumption, the predicate defined by an elementary formula is PR∗ com-
putable.
5.3. Conclusion
Thus the Main Lemma, and hence the Selection Theorem, follow from the Computable Equality Assumption.4
However, many important algebras do not have decidable equality!
Example. Consider the topological total algebra of reals
R = (R, N, B; 0, 1, +, −, ×, . . . ),
“topological” in the sense that all the carriers have topologies in terms of which the basic operations are continuous;
“total” in the sense that the basic operations are total [35]. R containing the carrier R of reals with its usual topology
and its ring operations, as well as the carriers N and B of naturals and booleans, with their discrete topologies and
standard operations.
Although there is an equality test on N, there is none on R, since a (total) equality operation on R cannot be
continuous.
However the specification language Lang(R) has, as atomic formulas, equations between terms of the same sort,
for all sorts, including real. Hence the atomic formulas in Lang(R) are not PR∗-computable.
4 This assumption was used, but its necessity was unfortunately not emphasised, in [30].
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Thus we want to find conditions for the Selection Theorem which do not need the Computable Equality Assumption.
We turn to this in the next two sections.
6. Selection theorem for algebras with intuitionistic proof systems
6.1. Realizability
We are looking for a way to prove the Selection Theorem without assuming PR decidability of elementary formulas,
or (equivalently) of equality at all sorts.
The solution we take (for now), following [36], is to use, not just a PR selector for an existential statement, but
a PR realizer for each formula, which also carries information on which component of a disjunction holds (as in the
antecedent of the conclusion of (5.6) or (5.7)). It will turn out we also have to restrict our attention to intuitionistic
systems.
We therefore define a realizability relation between term tuples and ∗1 formulas. First we need
Definition 1 (Type of a ∗1 formula). The type tp(P ) of a ∗1 formula P is a particular Σ∗-product type. It is defined
by structural induction on P :
(i) tp(t1 = t2) = bool.
(ii) tp(P1 ∧ P2) = tp(P1) × tp(P2).
(iii) tp(P1 ∨ P2) = bool × tp(P1) × tp(P2).
(iv) tp(∀k < t P ) = tp(P )∗
where, for any Σ∗-product type u, u∗ is the corresponding component-wise starred type; thus, if (say) u =
s1 × s2 × s∗3 × s∗4 × s5 then u∗ = s∗1 × s∗2 × s∗∗3 × s∗∗4 × s∗5 .
(v) tp(∃ysP ) = s × tp(P ) where s is any Σ∗-sort.
Remarks. (1) The base case, tp(t1 = t2), could really be defined to be any Σ-sort.
(2) The doubly starred sorts s∗∗ which appear in clause (iv) are not actually present in the signature Σ∗; the doubly
indexed (two-dimensional) arrays which they represent are actually effectively coded by one-dimensional arrays in a
well-known way.
The central concept of this section is a realizability relation between term tuples of a particular Σ∗-product type,
and ∗1 formulas of the same type.
Definition 2 (Realizability of ∗1 formulas). Let t be a Σ∗-term tuple, and P a ∗1 formula, both of the same product
type. We define the expression ‘t  P ’ (“t realizes P ”) to be a ∗1 formula, by structural induction on P :
(i) t  (t1 = t2) ≡ t1 = t2.
(ii) 〈t1, t2〉  (P1 ∧ P2) ≡ (t1  P1) ∧ (t2  P2).
(iii) 〈t0, t1, t2〉  (P1 ∨ P2) ≡ (t0 = true ∧ t1  P1) ∨ (t0 = false ∧ t2  P2).
(iv) t∗  (∀z < t0 P) ≡ ∀z < t0(t∗[z]  P).
(v) 〈t0, t〉  (∃yP) ≡ t  P 〈y/t0〉.
Remarks. (3) If P is a formula built up from equations using conjunction and BU quantification only, then t  P is
identical to P (by a simple induction on P ). In particular, the realizability of a BU equation P is the same as P .
(4) However, in cases (iii) and (v), the realizing tuple contains extra information: it includes a “witness” to the truth
of the disjunction or existential quantification respectively.
The above two remarks together imply that for a ∗1 formula P , realizability of P implies P . This is stated precisely
in the following
Lemma. For any ∗1 formula P and term tuple t of the same type, the sequent
t  P −→ P
is provable in intuitionistic predicate logic.
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As a sort of converse, we have the Selection Theorem (Theorems 1 and 2 of Section 5, with ‘∗1-Ind’ replaced by
the intuitionistic system ‘∗1-Indi’ throughout.) The Main Lemma, from which this immediately follows, asserts the
existence of a realizer for the succedent formula of a ∗1 sequent, which is PR not just in the free variables of the
sequent, but also in realizers of the antecedent formulas.
Main Lemma. Suppose the ∗1 sequent
Q1, . . . ,Qm −→ P
is provable in ∗1-Indi(Σ, T ). Let Q1, . . . ,Qm, P have types v1, . . . , vm, v respectively, and var(Q1, . . . ,Qm, P ) ⊆
x : u. Let z1, . . . , zm be tuples of variables, pairwise disjoint and disjoint from x, with zi : vi for i = 1, . . . , m. Then
for some tuple of PR schemes α : u × v1 × · · · × vm → v,
z1  Q1, . . . , zm  Qm −→ fα(x, z1, . . . , zm)  P (6.1)
is provable in ∗1-Indi(Σ∗α , T+Eα), where Σ∗α is the extension of Σ∗ with symbols for the function tuple together with
their auxiliary functions, and Eα is the equational specification for these functions.
6.2. Proof of the Main Lemma
The proof is, again, by induction on the length of a ∗1 derivation of (6.1) Note, in this connection, that the Cut
reduction lemma also applies to the intuitionistic system.
Note also that in this proof, using realizability, we do not need to transform the sequents to prenex form (as in
Section 5).
Again, there are cases according to the last inference.
We do not give a thorough proof of the Main Lemma, since such a proof is given in the next section for a stronger
result. For now, we only want to consider the three inferences which (explicitly or implicitly) use contraction in the
succedent in the classical case and hence needed decidability of equality, namely Contr:R, ∧R and ∨L, (see Section
5.2). First, Contr:R is not part of the intuitionistic system. Secondly, ∧R is no longer a problem, since the (implicit)
contractions here apply only to non-principal formulas in the succedent, which do not exist in the intuitionistic system.
That leaves ∨L:
, Q1 −→ P , Q2 −→ P
, Q1 ∨ Q2 −→ P
with all the free variables in the conclusion included in x. By induction hypotheses there are PR∗ schemes α1, α2 such
that
z  , z1  Q1 −→ fα1(x, z, z1)  P,
z  , z2  Q2 −→ fα2(x, z, z2)  P
(6.2)
are provable. Define a PR∗ scheme tuple β such that (with z0 : bool, and the other variables as in (6.2))
fβ(x, z, z0, z1, z2) =
{
fα1(x, z, z1) if z0 = true,
fα2(x, z, z2) otherwise.
Then
z  , (z0, z1, z2)  Q1 ∨ Q2 −→ fβ(x, z, z0, z1, z2)  P. (6.3)
Remark: Notice here the use of the realizability property for disjunctions (see Remark (4) in Section 6.1) to decide
effectively which component of the disjunction Q1 ∨ Q2 holds. (Remember that the elementary formulas of Lang(Σ∗)
need not be computable!)
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6.3. Conclusion
In this section, using concepts of realizability, we were able to prove the Main Lemma, and hence the Selection
Theorem, without having to assume computability of equality, but at the expense of having to work with an intuitionistic
proof system.
Hence the result in this section cannot really be considered a generalization of the Parsons–Mints–Takeuti Theorem.
7. Selection theorem for algebras without computable equality and with a classical proof system
7.1. Our aim; counterexample?
We want to prove the Main Lemma, and hence the Selection Theorem, for algebras without either of the restrictions
of the last two sections, i.e., without the computable equality assumption, and without having to work in intuitionistic
systems.
We should first ask, however: is the Selection Theorem true without these two restrictions? Here is a proposed
counterexample. Consider the algebra R of reals (Section 5.3) and the quantifier-free formula
P(x, y) ≡df (x /= 0 ∧ y = 0) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ y = 1),
where x, y : real. Then
∀x ∃yP(x, y)
is classically true and easily provable classically. But the (unique) selection function for this is not continuous on R,
and hence not PR∗ computable on R.
Note, however, that P has a negated equality, and is therefore not elementary, according to our definition (Section
4.1(b)), or even ∗1!
7.2. Solution: extend realizability to sequents
The solution is to extend the concept of realizability used in Section 6 to realizability of sequents, following [24].
So given a sequent
 ≡ P1, . . . , Pn
of product type u = u1 × · · · × un, and a Σ∗-term tuple
r¯ = 〈r0, r1, . . . , rn〉
of “matching” type nat × u1, . . . , un, we define
r¯   (“ r¯ realizes  ”)
to mean
(r0 = 1 ∧ r1  P1) ∨ (r0 = 2 ∧ r2  P2) ∨ · · · ∨ (r0 = n ∧ rn  Pn)
(where ‘  ’ is defined as in Section 6.1). Notice that r¯ has an initial term r0 of type nat, followed by a term tuple of
the same product type as .
Intuitively, r¯ realizes  (understood disjunctively) by selecting one of the Pi according to the value i of r0, and
then realizing it with ri . We call the term r0 the index of the realizer r¯ , since it indicates which formula in  is actually
being realized.
We can now state the current version of the Main Lemma (cf. Section 6.1).
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Main Lemma. Suppose the ∗1 sequent
Q1, . . . ,Qm −→ P1, . . . , Pn (7.1)
is provable in ∗1-Ind(Σ, T ). Let Q1, . . . ,Qm, P1, . . . , Pn have types v1, . . . , vm,w1, . . . . . . , wn respectively, and
var(Q1, . . . ,Qm, P1, . . . , Pn) ⊆ x : u. Let z1, . . . , zm be tuples of variables, pairwise disjoint and disjoint from x,
with zi : vi for i = 1, . . . , m. Then for some tuple of PR∗ schemes α : u × v1 × · · · × vm → nat × w1 × · · · × wn,
z1  Q1, . . . , zm  Qm −→ fα(x, z1, . . . , zm)  (P1, . . . , Pn) (7.2)
is provable in ∗1-Indi(Σ∗α , T+Eα), where Σ∗α is the extension of Σ∗ with symbols for the function tuple together with
their auxiliary functions, and Eα is the equational specification for these functions.
7.3. Proof of Main Lemma
We introduce the following terminology and notation.
(i) The sequent (7.1) is said to be covered by x if var(Q1, . . . ,Qm, P1, . . . , Pn) ⊆ x.
(ii) We express (7.2) by saying that fα realizes the sequent (7.1) (w.r.t. x).
(iii) Suppose  ≡ Q1, . . . ,Qm, with Qi : vi . Then we write  : v1 × · · · × vm. If, further, z ≡ z1, . . . , zm with
zi : vi , then we write ‘z  ’ for z1  Q1, . . . , zm  Qm. Note that this is just a notational shorthand ( is
read “conjunctively”); it is not the same as the new concept ‘z  ’ defined in Section 7.2 (where  is read
“disjunctively”).
By the Cut Reduction Lemma (in Section 5.1) we may assume we have a ∗1 derivation of (7.1). The required PR∗
schemes are then constructed by induction on the length of such a derivation.
The base case involves initial sequents. By the Remark on Initial Sequents (in Section 4.2) the initial sequents
contain only BU equations, except for axiom (4.5a). Hence the result holds trivially for all initial sequents other than
(4.5a), since by Remark 3 in Section 6.1, any BU equational sequent can be trivially realized, by (for example) a
function tuple of the correct type with default constant value. (Here the Instantiation Assumption on Σ (Section 2.1)
is being used.)
As for the initial sequent (4.5a), or rather a substitution instance
−→ (t = true) ∨ (t = false)
for any boolean term t with var(t) ⊆ x : u (say), this can be realized by a scheme tuple α : u → nat × bool3, where
fα(x) = 〈1, (t, true, true)〉.
For the induction step, there are different cases according to the last inference of the derivation.
Consider now the three inferences which (explicitly or implicitly) use contraction in the succedent: Contr:R, ∧R
and ∨L. First, Contr:R:
 −→ P,P,
 −→ P,  . (7.3)
Suppose the conclusion is covered by x : u. Then the premiss is also covered by x. Assume  : v, P : w0 and  : w.
By induction hypothesis, there is a PR∗ scheme tuple α : u × v → nat × w20 × w which realizes the premiss of
(7.3), i.e., such that
z   −→ fα(x, z)  P,P,
is provable. Put fα(x, z) = 〈r0, r1, r2, r¯〉 where the realizing terms r0 : nat, r1 : v, r2 : v and r¯ : w represent PR∗
functions applied to x,z.
We can then easily construct a PR∗ scheme tuple β : u × v → nat × w0 × w with
fβ(x, z) = 〈r ′0, r ′1, r¯〉,
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where
r ′0 =
{
1 if r0 = 1 ∨ r0 = 2,
r0 − 1 if r0 > 2
and
r ′1 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
r1 if r0 = 1,
r2 if r0 = 2,
arbitrary if r0 > 2.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.3).
Remark: The contracted formula P is realized in the conclusion by either r1 or r2 (which realized the two occurrences
of P in the premisses) depending on the value of the index r0, and hence of r ′0.
Suppose now the last inference is ∧R:
 −→ P1,   −→ P2, 
 −→ P1 ∧ P2,  . (7.4)
Suppose the conclusion is covered by x : u. Then the premisses are also covered by x. Assume : v, P1 : w1, P2 : w2
and  : w.
By induction hypothesis there are PR∗ scheme tuples α1 : u × v → nat × w1 × w and α2 : u × v → nat ×
w2 × w which realize the premisses of (7.4), i.e., such that
z   −→ fα1(x, z)  P1,,
z   −→ fα2(x, z)  P2,
are provable. Put
fα1(x, z) = 〈r10 , r11 , r¯1〉,
fα2(x, z) = 〈r20 , r21 , r¯2〉,
where ri0 : nat, ri1 : wi and r¯ i : w (i = 1, 2). We can then construct a PR∗ scheme tuple β : u × v → nat × (w1 ×
w2) × w where
fβ(x, z) = 〈r0, r1, r¯〉
with
r0 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if r10 = 1 ∧ r20 = 1,
r10 if r
1
0 > 1,
r20 if r
1
0 = 1 ∧ r20 > 1
and
r1 = (r11 , r21 )
and
r¯ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
r¯ 1 if r10 > 1,
r¯ 2 if r10 = 1 ∧ r20 > 1,
arbitrary if r10 = 1 ∧ r20 = 1.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.4).
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Remark: The side formulas in the succedent, i.e., the formulas in , are implicitly contracted. Each one is realized by
the corresponding term in either r¯ 1 or r¯ 2, depending on the values of the indices r10 and r
2
0 . Note that in the absence
of such side formulas, i.e., if  is empty (as in the intuitionistic system), the construction of the scheme β from α is
very simple.
The remaining inference that uses contraction in the succedent is ∨L:
, Q1 −→  , Q2 −→ 
, Q1 ∨ Q2 −→  .
Here the construction of a realizer for the conclusion from realizers for the premisses is almost exactly the same as in
the intuitionistic case (Section 6.2). The only difference is that the string ‘ P ’, which occur in three places (at the
right end of the sequents (6.2) and (6.3)), is replaced by ‘ ’.
In the cases thinning, interchange and Contr:L, a realizer for the conclusion can be obtained easily from a realizer
for the premiss.
Consider now the logical inferences. Since the derivation is ∗1 , there are no ‘→’ or ‘∀’ inferences.
We have dealt with ∧R and ∨L above. The cases ∧L is quite simple. Consider now ∨R:
 −→ P1, P2, 
 −→ P1 ∨ P2, . (7.5)
Suppose the conclusion is covered by x. Then so is the premiss.
By induction hypothesis there is a scheme tuple α which realizes the premiss of (7.5), i.e., such that
z   −→ fα(x, z)  P1, P2,.
Put
fα(z) = 〈r0, r1, r2, r¯〉.
Then we can construct a scheme tuple β such that
fβ(x, z) = 〈r ′0, 〈rB, r1, r2〉, r¯〉,
where
r ′0 =
{
1 if r0 = 1 ∨ r0 = 2,
r0 − 1 if r0 > 2
and rB : bool with
rB =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
true if r0 = 1,
false if r0 = 2,
arbitrary if r0 > 2.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.5).
Suppose the last inference is ∀bR:
, a < t −→ P(a), 
 −→ ∀k < t P (k),  , (7.6)
where the eigenvariable a : nat does not occur in the conclusion. Suppose the conclusion is covered by x : u. Then
the premiss is covered by (x, a) : u × nat. Assume  : v, P : w0 and  : w.
By induction hypothesis there is a PR∗ scheme tuple α : u × nat × v × bool → nat × w0 × w which realizes the
premiss of (7.6), i.e.,
z  , z0  a < t −→ fα(x, a, z, z0)  P(a),.
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Note that a < t means lessnat(a, t) = true, which is trivially realized by anything of type bool. Put
fα(a, x, z, z0) = 〈r0(a), r1(a), r¯(a)〉
(making explicit the dependence of the realizing terms on the eigenvariable a). We can then construct a scheme tuple
β : u × v → nat × w∗0 × w (note the array type in the range!) such that
fβ(x, z) = 〈r ′0, r∗1 , r¯ ′〉,
where r ′0 : nat, r∗1 : w∗0 and r¯ ′ : w are defined as follows:
Case 1: For all k < t , r0(k) = 1. Then define
r ′0 = 1
and r¯ ′ arbitrarily (for example, r¯ ′ = r¯(0)).
Case 2: For some k0 < t , r0(k0) > 1. Then define
r ′0 = r0(k0),
r¯ ′ = r¯(k0).
And in both cases, define r∗1 : w∗0 by
r∗1 [k] = r1(k) for all k < t.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.6).
Remarks: (1) The two cases above are PR∗ distinguishable, being based on bounded quantification, which is primitive
recursively decidable. (2) The choice of k0 in Case 2 is not important, since the formulas in  do not contain the
eigenvariable a, and hence their realizability by r¯(a) does not depend on the value k of a.
Now suppose the last inference is ∀bL:
 −→ t0 < t,  , Q(t0) −→ 
, ∀k < t Q(k) −→  .
Let tˆ0 be the term formed from t0 by replacing all variables in t0 which are not free in the conclusion by default terms
of the same sort. (Here the Instantiation Assumption is being used.) Then the derivation can be easily modified so as
to end in the inference
 −→ tˆ0 < t,  , Q(tˆ0) −→ 
, ∀k < t Q(k) −→  (7.7)
with the same conclusion, but with the additional property that if x : u covers the conclusion, then it also covers both
premisses. Assume  : v, Q : v0 and  : w.
By induction hypothesis, there are scheme tuples α1 : u × v → nat × bool × w and α2 : u × v × v0 → nat × w
such that fα1 and fα2 realize the two premisses of (7.7), i.e.:
z   −→ fα1(x, z)  tˆ0 < t,,
z  , z0  Q(tˆ0) −→ fα2(x, z, z0)  .
Put
fα1(x, z) = 〈r10 , true, r¯ 1〉,
fα2(x, z, z0) = 〈r20 (z0), r¯ 2(z0)〉
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(making explicit the dependence of the realizing terms on the realizer z0 of Q(tˆ0)). Note again that the atomic formula
tˆ0 < t is trivially realized by anything of type bool.) Now we can construct a scheme tuple β : u × v × v∗0 → nat × w
(note the array type in the domain!) with
fβ(x, z, z∗0) = 〈r0, r¯〉,
where
r0 =
{
r20 (z
∗
0[tˆ0]) if r10 = 1,
r10 if r
1
0 > 1
and
r¯ =
{
r¯ 2(z∗0[tˆ0]) if r10 = 1,
r¯ 1 if r10 > 1.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.7).
Suppose next that the last inference is ∃R:
 −→ P(t), 
 −→ ∃yP(y),  .
As with ∀bL, let tˆ be the term formed from t by replacing all variables in t which are not free in the conclusion by
default terms of the same sort. (Here again the Instantiation Assumption is being used.) Then the derivation can be
easily modified so as to end in the inference
 −→ P(tˆ), 
 −→ ∃yP(y),  (7.8)
with the same conclusion, but with the additional property that if x : u covers the conclusion, then it also covers the
premiss.
By induction hypothesis, there is a PR∗ scheme tuple α such that fα realizes the premiss of (7.8), i.e.,
z   −→ fα(x, z)  P(tˆ),.
Put
fα(x, z) = 〈r0, r1, r¯〉.
We can then construct a scheme tuple β such that
fβ(x, z) = 〈r0, 〈tˆ , r1〉, r¯〉.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.8).
Suppose next that the last inference is ∃L:
, Q(a) −→ 
, ∃yQ(y) −→  , (7.9)
where the eigenvariable a does not occur in the conclusion. Assume  : v, Q : v0,  : w and y : s. Assume also that
the conclusion is covered by x : u. Then the premiss is covered by (x, a) : u × s.
By induction hypothesis, there is a scheme tuple α : (u × s) × v × v0 → nat × w which realizes the premiss of
(7.9), i.e.,
z  , z0  Q(a) −→ fα((x, a), z, z0)  .
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So define β : u × v × (s × v0) → nat × w by
fβ(x, z, (a, z0)) = fα((x, a), z, z0).
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.9), i.e.,
z  , (a, z0)  ∃yQ(y) −→ fβ((x, z, (a, z0))  .
Comment: Notice that fβ is essentially the same as fα , except that the eigenvariable a, which is one of the free variables
of the sequent in the premiss, is re-interpreted as part of the realizer of ∃yQ(y) in the conclusion.
Now suppose the last inference is a cut, which we take, for convenience, in the following form:
 −→ P,  , P −→ 
 −→  .
Since the derivation is ∗1 by the Cut Reduction Lemma, the cut formula P is 
∗
1 . Now (as with ∀bL and ∃R) let P̂
be the formula formed from P by replacing all variables in P which are not free in the conclusion by default terms of
the same sort. (Here again the Instantiation Assumption is being used.) Then the derivation can be simply modified so
as to end in the cut
 −→ P̂ ,  , P̂ −→ 
 −→  (7.10)
with the same conclusion, but with the additional property that if x : u covers the conclusion, then it also covers the
premisses.
Assume that  : v,  : w and P̂ : v0. By induction hypothesis, there are schemes α : u × v → nat × v0 × w
and β : u × v × v0 → nat × w which realize the two premisses, i.e.,
z   −→ fα(x, z)  P̂ ,,
z  , z0  P̂ −→ fβ(x, z, z0)  .
We can construct a scheme tuple γ : u × v → nat × w as follows. Put
fα(x, z) = 〈r0, r1, r¯〉.
There are two cases.
Case 1: r0 > 1. Then we let
fγ (x, z) = 〈r0, r¯〉.
Case 2: r0 = 1. Then we let
fγ (x, z) = fβ(x, z, r1).
Then fγ realizes the conclusion of (7.10).
Comment: So the conclusion of a cut is realized essentially by composition of the realizers of the premisses.
Suppose, finally, that the last inference is ∗1 induction (repeating (4.4) here for convenience):
, P (a) −→ P(Sa), 
, P (0) −→ P(t),  , (7.11)
where the induction formula P(a) is ∗1, and the induction variable a : nat does not occur in ,  or P(0). Suppose
the conclusion is covered by x : u. Then the premiss is covered by (x, a) : u × nat. Assume  : v, P (a) : v0 and
 : w.
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By induction hypothesis there is a scheme α : nat × u × v × v0 → nat × v0 × w which realizes the premiss, i.e.,
z  , z0  P(a) −→ fα(x, a, z, z0)  P(Sa),. (7.12)
Put
fα(x, a, z, z0) = 〈r0(a, z0), r1(a, z0), r2(a, z0), . . .〉 (7.13)
(making explicit the dependence of the realizing terms r0, r1, r2, . . . on the variables a and z0). Now we construct a
scheme β : u × v × v0 → nat × v0 × w such that
fβ(x, z, z0) = 〈r ′0(t, z0), r ′1(t, z0), r ′2(t, z0), . . .〉,
where the realizers r ′0, r ′1, r ′2, . . . are defined by simultaneous primitive recursion:
Base case:
r ′i (0, z0) = ri(0, z0) for i /= 1,
r ′1(0, z0) = z0.
Recursion step: For all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . :
r ′i (n+ 1, z0) =
{
r ′i (n, z0) if r ′0(n, z0) > 1,
ri(n, r
′
1(n, z0)) if r
′
0(n, z0) = 1 (the “interesting case”).
Thus, as soon as the index points to a realizer in , i.e., r ′0(n, z0) > 1, everything remains constant; otherwise we
carry on inductively as expected.
Then fβ realizes the conclusion of (7.11), i.e.,
z  , z0  P(0) −→ fβ(x, z, z0)  P(t),
is provable by ∗1-induction on (the value of) t .
This concludes the proof of the Main Lemma, and hence of the Selection Theorem.
8. Some concluding remarks
8.1. The use of starred sorts and systems
Note first that the use of starred (or array) sorts is strongly connected with the use of the bounded universal quantifier.
For (in one direction)
(1) BU conditional equations are used in the axiomatization of array equality (see Eq. (4.6));
and (in the other direction)
(2) an existentially quantified variable changes to a starred sort when permuting with a BU quantifier in the
transformation to prenex form (Section 4.1, Lemma 1);
(3) an array term is needed for the realization of BU quantification (Section 6.1, Def. 2(iv));
and hence
(4) an array-valued function is needed for the conclusion of a ∀bR inference, either as a selector for the prenex form
(in Section 5) or as a realizer (in Section 7; see (7.6)).
In fact, the use of starred sorts and systems in this paper (for example, ∗1-Ind(Σ, T ) instead of 1-Ind(Σ, T )), and
the use of BU quantification (as a clause in the definition of ∗1 formulas, and as a primitive inference rule) could
both have been omitted. The main results of this paper, i.e., the Selection and Provable Selection Theorems, as used in
Sections 5–7, could all have been formulated in a “starless” and “BU-less” form.
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However, working with array sorts, and BU quantification, allowed the results to be presented in a more general
setting.
For example, the construction of the ∗1 computation predicate Pα , discussed in Section 4.6, needs starred sorts,
even for PR schemes α. Hence the Totality Lemma in Section 4.6 (even for PR schemes), and the Corollary in Section
5.1 (even for μPR schemes) both need starred sorts, even for their formulation.
8.2. Total vs partial algebras
In this paper we have considered only total algebras. This is a real restriction, since partial basic functions occur
quite naturally in topological algebras; consider, for example, the algebra R of reals (1.3) augmented with continuous
partial operators of division, equality and order [34]. To extend the current theory to such partial algebras would entail
extending the proof theory used here to a logic of partial terms or definedness (see, e.g., [2, pp. 97–99] and [11]). This
is likely to be a major undertaking, but one worth pursuing.
8.3. Other functional interpretations
It would be interesting to know whether the results of this paper could also be obtained using other types of functional
interpretation; for example, a version of Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation [1], or a Herbrand-style interpretation [5,
Section 2.5], versions of which have also been applied to fragments of arithmetic [23,15], or the (related) “witness
function” methods of Buss [6,3,4].
Recall that Herbrand interpretations are typically applied to classical systems, to transform proofs of existential
statements
∃yP(x, y) (8.1)
with P quantifier-free, to proofs of finite disjunctions
P(x, t1) ∨ . . . ∨ P(x, tn) (8.2)
(n ≥ 1, ti term tuples containing x). Now to construct a selection function for (8.1), assuming the system has decidable
atomic formulas, (8.2) can be contracted to a statement
P(x, t) (8.3)
for a single term tuple t constructed with a simple definition by cases, as in Section 5. However, without decidability of
atomic formulas, it is not at all apparent how to proceed from (8.2) to (8.3) (or, for that matter, to interpret 1 induction
suitably) without analysing the proof of (8.2) (or (8.1)) by a realizability interpretation, as in Section 7.
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